Malicious code in chalk-pack (npm)
Source: amazon-inspector
Package is named chalk-pack (impersonating chalk) with keywords and index.js impersonating lodash; index.js is a stub that self-describes as 'Just a dummy module. The real payload is in postinstall.js'. On npm install, postinstall.js executes a two-part stealer: (1) credential harvester — reads ~/.npmrc, ~/.env, and ~/.git-credentials, extracts npm auth tokens (npm_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36} and //registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=...), and scrapes environment variables shaped like tokens/API keys/DB URLs/cloud/payment credentials; (2) crypto-wallet stealer — iterates 71 hardcoded Chromium/Brave/Edge/Firefox extension IDs for MetaMask, Phantom, Coinbase, Trust, Binance, OKX, Ledger, Trezor, Rabby, Keplr, Solflare, BitKeep, etc., reads Local Extension Settings/<extId>/*.log, regex-matches vault, seed, mnemonic, privateKey, and encrypted wallet JSON, and also walks ~/Documents, ~/Desktop, ~/Downloads for BIP39-word-count-matching files. All collected data is POSTed as JSON to http://149.28.127.35:8888 (plaintext HTTP, bare IP) hardcoded in const C2=process.env.C2_URL||'http://149.28.127.35:8888' at postinstall.js:7. The file header advertises itself as 'Token harvester + Crypto wallet scanner / Runs on npm install. Silent. Zero trace.' and every fs/http call is wrapped in try{}catch(e){} to suppress errors. Multiple independent attack fingerprints co-occur: hardcoded C2 in a lifecycle hook, installer-secret credential-file reads, wallet extension ID list, BIP39 seed-phrase scanner, and typosquat of a top-registry package — each independently sufficient.
