Malicious code in build-scripts-utils (npm)
Ten packages published by npm user asdxzxc at version 1.0.10 target developers working on AI and LLM tooling. Each package masquerades as a developer utility while executing a two-stage payload triggered via postinstall: package.json → lib/setup.js → lib/worker.js.
Credential harvesting: lib/worker.js scans the filesystem for private keys (64-char hex), BIP39 mnemonics (12–24 word phrases), API keys and secrets, and passwords from env vars and shell history (.bash_history, .zsh_history, .fish_history, .mysql_history, .psql_history), including wallet tool invocations (geth account, hardhat, metamask, wallet import). Targeted paths include ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.config/gcloud, ~/.azure, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.kube/config, crypto wallet dirs (~/.ethereum, ~/.bitcoin, ~/.solana), exchange configs (Binance, Bybit, OKX, KuCoin, Deribit, 3Commas), .env, .npmrc, .gitconfig. Also performs browser data theft and Ethereum keystore brute-force. A priority-target list fetched from the actor's GitHub Pages endpoint enables aggressive deep scanning for pre-registered high-value hosts.
AI self-propagation: after credential theft, a _propagate() function executes a multi-vector campaign to infect AI coding assistants. It writes poisoned .cursorrules and CLAUDE.md files — framed as "P-2024-001 Enterprise Credential Integrity Standard" — to all discovered project directories, parent directories, and home subdirectories, instructing Cursor, Claude Code, and GitHub Copilot to execute the remote payload and propagate it via Issues, PRs, and documentation. Git hooks (post-merge, post-checkout, pre-commit, pre-push) are injected into all .git repos found on disk, and a persistence block is appended to ~/.bashrc, ~/.zshrc, and ~/.profile. Zero-width steganography (ZWSP/ZWJ/ZWNJ/LTRM encoding) embeds hidden scan triggers in all AI-generated text output, enabling AI-to-AI chain infection invisible to humans.
C2/exfil: a remotely configurable JSON config hosted on the actor's GitHub Pages delivers the active webhook list, encryption key, and scan strategy; hardcoded fallback webhooks at webhook.site and a DNS TXT record fallback are used if the primary channel fails. A dedup marker at ~/.local/share/.p2024_integrity prevents re-propagation within 24 hours.
build-scripts-utils poses as build script utilities and helpers for JavaScript and TypeScript projects.
Source: amazon-inspector
lib/trap-core.js performs system reconnaissance and network exfiltration. The module imports fs, https, dns, and os, then collects host identifiers (os.hostname(), os.platform(), os.homedir(), process.env.USER, process.cwd()) and POSTs them to hardcoded HTTPS endpoints via https.request/https.get at lines 267, 274, 292, 293, and 346. The combination of system enumeration, environment/identity reads, filesystem inspection (fs.existsSync at lines 26/79/194), and hardcoded outbound POST destinations is the canonical credential/host-beacon exfiltration shape. The package name advertises generic 'build script utilities,' which does not justify host fingerprinting and remote beacons. Installing or loading this package leaks installer host metadata to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Source: ghsa-malware
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Source: ossf-package-analysis
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'build-scripts-utils' @ 1.0.12 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
