🛡️ MAL-2026-4611 — midpatch

Malicious code in midpatch (npm)

Source: amazon-inspector

The package advertises a logger middleware (keywords fast/logger/stream/json, exports module.exports.pino = middleware, file.js wraps a ./pino module) so consumers will install and mount it as Express middleware. On first invocation, index.js spawns a detached, stdio-ignored child process running node lib/caller.js, which fetches JavaScript from https://jsonkeeper.com/b/XRGF3 (a public, attacker-mutable paste host) and evaluates the response's cookie field via new Function.constructor('require', s)(require), granting the remote payload full Node require access. The C2 URLs are base64-obfuscated inside fake process.env defaults (DEV_API_KEY: "aHR0cHM6Ly9qc29ua2VlcGVyLmNvbS9iL1hSR0Yz" and a second paste ID 4NAKK in lib/const.js) to evade casual review and string scanners. The combination of pino-shaped lure + detached/hidden child + remote-fetched eval from a mutable paste host + base64-hidden endpoints is unambiguous supply-chain RCE — any consumer that mounts the middleware executes attacker-controlled code.