Malicious code in test-weavedb-sdk (npm)
Source: amazon-inspector
Package name impersonates the legitimate weavedb-sdk; lib/index.js is a near-verbatim copy of that SDK's Arweave/Warp/EthCrypto class so the package functions as a drop-in substitute. package.json declares "preinstall": "./dist/runtime.node", directly executing a 976KB opaque ELF on every npm install. The.node extension is deceptive — legitimate Node native addons are loaded via require()/dlopen, not spawned as standalone executables. Strings recovered from the binary include HTTP/1.1, POST, DELETE, https://, USERPROFILE, LIBBPF_0.0 (eBPF), PTRACE, Ed25519, and RSA_PKCS1_ — capabilities (HTTP egress, kernel-level eBPF, anti-debug ptrace, home-directory enumeration, cryptographic operations) consistent with an info-stealer / C2 implant and unrelated to the package's advertised purpose. The binary ships without source, build system, or any documentation, and runs unconditionally with the installer's privileges at install time.
Source: google-open-source-security
This package was compromised as part of the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.
