Malicious code in vue-compiler-sfc-plugin (npm)
Source: amazon-inspector
Package name and README impersonate the official @vue/compiler-sfc package; index.js merely re-exports it. The npm postinstall hook runs postinstall-run.cjs which invokes tooling-bootstrap.cjs. tooling-bootstrap.cjs concatenates a fragmented base64 array (BOOTSTRAP_B64), decodes it, writes the resulting JS to ~/.gradle/daemon/tooling-api-runtime.mjs (a Gradle-daemon cover name), and detached-spawns it with the user's node binary (spawn(nodeBin, args, { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore', windowsHide: true }); child.unref()). Activation is gated by victim-project sentinels (ALLOWED_PROJECT_SENTINELS includes 'src/businessCom/BLinker.vue' and 'src/api/gameCategorie.js'), so the RAT only deploys inside the intended victim's repo — evading sandboxed install scanners. The decoded payload is a long-running C2 agent that POSTs hostname, OS user, and OS info to https://npmjs.it.com/api/register, persists an agent id at ~/.gradle-cache/.aid, polls https://npmjs.it.com/api/task/<agent>, and dispatches operator-issued ops: exec (spawn /bin/sh or cmd.exe with attacker-supplied command), ls, download (read arbitrary path and POST bytes to /api/file/<agent>/<task>), upload (write attacker-supplied base64 to arbitrary path), delete (fs.rmSync), move, ps. C2 defaults to https://npmjs.it.com/ (a typosquat of npmjs.com) and TLS verification can be disabled via C2_TLS_INSECURE. This is a fully-featured backdoor enabling credential theft (~/.aws, ~/.ssh,.env,.npmrc), arbitrary code execution, and persistent remote control of any machine where install hits the targeted project.
