Malicious code in @marketfront/infopopup (npm)
The @marketfront/infopopup package is part of a 25-package malicious campaign batch-published to the @marketfront npm scope by npm user 'marketfront' ([email protected]) within a roughly 3-minute window on 2026-07-01. All packages in the campaign were published at version 7.0.0 and use e-commerce/marketing frontend component names as cover.
The package declares a postinstall hook (node scripts/postinstall.js) that executes heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style) code automatically at npm install time. Static analysis of the decoded payload revealed a credential harvester that dynamically requires fs, os, http, https, zlib, path and dns, then reads approximately 20 sensitive credential files including ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.pgpass, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.env and ~/.bash_history. Collected data is exfiltrated via a gzip-compressed HTTPS POST with a custom X-Secret header to the path /api/v1/events, alongside a DNS resolver beacon. The command-and-control host is concealed behind an additional RC4+XOR encryption layer around an embedded configuration blob and was not statically resolved.
The decoded behavioral payload (module requires, credential-file target list, exfiltration headers and endpoint) is byte-for-byte identical across sampled packages in the campaign. The campaign shares tooling and infrastructure patterns (obfuscated postinstall credential harvester, X-Secret header, /api/v1/events exfiltration path, RC4-concealed C2) with the earlier @emcd-vue campaign, indicating the same actor rotating scopes and disposable maintainer emails.
Source: amazon-inspector
On npm install, the declared postinstall script (scripts/postinstall.js) runs a heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style, RC4/XOR string-array decoded) payload that harvests installer-owned secrets and identity: reads ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/known_hosts, ~/.npmrc, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.gitconfig, and shell history files; bulk-serialises process.env; and collects hostname, user, network interfaces, CPU/OS. The collected data is encrypted and transmitted over two exfiltration channels: an HTTPS POST to a runtime-decoded remote endpoint, and a DNS-tunnel channel built via new dns.Resolver().resolve4(...) that splits the encrypted body into ≤50-character labels queried under an attacker-controlled parent domain to survive HTTPS egress filtering. Package metadata advertises a fabricated corporate identity (*.marketfront.io hosts that do not exist; README references an internal-corp.io auth endpoint) as a dependency-confusion cover story for what is otherwise a credential-stealer. Declared purpose ("internal authentication client") does not require reading AWS/SSH/npm/Docker/Git credential files or DNS-tunnelling encrypted blobs.
