🛡️ MAL-2026-6855 — next-bignumber.js

Malicious code in next-bignumber.js (npm)

Source: amazon-inspector

Package impersonates the widely-used bn.js crypto library: README, repository URL, logo, and source files are copied verbatim from indutny/bn.js, but the package is published under an unrelated author. The package.json author field is craig silverman while homepage and repository point at github.com/indutny/next-bignumber.js (Fedor Indutny is the real bn.js maintainer), and the README retains the upstream sponsor links to github.com/sponsors/indutny — identity-spoofing metadata designed to mislead installers into believing they are getting an indutny package. The package adds a non-bn.js runtime dependency, random-string-64, with no mathematical purpose: lib/bn.js:40 does const getUniqueID = require('random-string-64').default; (loaded at module top level on every require('next-bignumber.js')) and BN.prototype.toString invokes getUniqueID(64); var test=213; on the hot path of every crypto operation that calls .toString() on a BN (Ethereum, secp256k1, and similar workflows hit this constantly). Whatever random-string-64 ships executes in the installer's/consumer's process on import and on every numeric stringification. The combination of a copied-upstream typosquat targeting a top-tier crypto library, mismatched/spoofed author metadata, and a gratuitous transitive dependency wired into a hot code path is a namespace-abuse dropper shape — the lure package itself is thin, but installing it silently pulls random-string-64 into the installer's tree and executes it.

Source: ghsa-malware

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.