runc: Malicious image with /dev symlink can trigger limited host filesystem integrity violations
When setting up the container rootfs, setupPtmx and setupDevSymlinks call os.Remove and os.Symlink with a filepath.Join string which allow an image with /dev as a symlink to trick runc into deleting files called ptmx on the host or creating a hardcoded set of symlinks with specific names and targets in an arbitrary pre-existing host directory.
Please note that this issue is not exploitable under Docker because [it creates a top-level ro layer that masks any malicious /dev symlink present in the container image](https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/docker-v29.4.1/daemon/initlayer/setup_unix.go) (this is also done without mounting the lower layers so there is no opportunity for the malicious /dev symlink to trick it into resolving to some other path). Unfortunately, Podman and containerd<sup>†</sup> do not do this and so users using those higher-level runtimes with runc can be exploited via a malicious image.
This issue mirrors a [somewhat similar issue in crun](https://github.com/containers/crun/security/advisories/GHSA-7vwr-4279-7gq5), which was also published recently.
There are a few mitigating factors about this issue which reduce the impact for most users quite significantly, and is the reason why we decided to release the fix publicly without an embargo.
While the deletion of ptmx seems like a significant issue, in practice it is quite limited. Notably, devpts does not permit you to unlink /dev/pts/ptmx regardless of privileges and so it is not a usable target for this attack. Additionally, while /dev/ptmx *can* be unlinked<sup>‡</sup>, trying to use an image with a symlink from /dev to /dev will cause runc will return an error before it reaches the buggy code (it correctly detects a symlink loop while setting up the mount target and the code correctly scopes the lookup inside the container). Thus, the only files called ptmx that are *guaranteed* to exist on the system cannot actually be removed by this bug and so only some user file that happens to have that specific name could be deleted, which seems fairly unlikely to happen on real systems.
As for the issue of symlinks, again the impact is likely quite limited. While the creation of *arbitrary* symlinks could be used to create drop-in files for system services (and thus lead to a container breakout), the hardcoded set of symlink names and targets that this bug allows you to create on the host make it quite unlikely that you would be able to do much more than pollute the host system with dummy symlinks. Here is the complete list of symlinks that can be created with this attack:
core → /proc/kcorefd → /proc/self/fd/ptmx → pts/ptmxstdin → /proc/self/fd/0stdout → /proc/self/fd/1stderr → /proc/self/fd/2Note that none of these symlinks are likely to point to user-controlled data -- the /proc/self/fd/$n symlinks are all properties of the process accessing them (so privileged processes will only see the state they were spawned with) and the pts/ptmx symlink is almost certainly in the same privilege scope as the directory the symlink itself is in. It seems the only somewhat plausible impact would be that a service could return an error when trying to parse one of these symlinks and thus treat it as an invalid configuration file. How arbitrary processes deal with this situation is a bit hard to analyse, but most daemons require configuration files to have certain suffixes (such as .conf) so it's not really clear how large the impact is in practice and it seems there are a few barriers to clear to use this to cause a DoS or other problems.
glibc seemingly only attempts to use /dev/ptmx when creating new terminals and thus most terminal managers (including tmux) and shell tools (including sudo -- but not su) would fail to start and thus bring the system to a halt. setupPtmx does add a symlink to /dev/pts/ptmx afterwards but on some systems the mode of the host /dev/pts/ptmx is set to 0o000 which would still cause the same DoS issue.This issue has been patched in runc 1.3.6, runc 1.4.3, and runc 1.5.0-rc.3.
Using user namespaces restricts this attack fairly significantly such that t
This issue can be reached with local access to the system, attack complexity is low, an attacker needs no privileges on the target. A user must be tricked into taking some action. The scope is unchanged, so the impact stays within the vulnerable component. Rated impact: confidentiality none, integrity low, availability none.
The score comes from this vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
CVE-2026-41579 is classified as CWE-61: UNIX Symbolic Link (Symlink) Following. The product, when opening a file or directory, does not sufficiently account for when the file is a symbolic link that resolves to a target outside of the intended control sphere.
CVE-2026-41579 is recorded against 2 packages.
Published on 22 June 2026 and last revised on 8 July 2026. No public exploit is currently recorded for this entry. A vendor advisory or fix has been published. Record sourced from NVD.
github.com (Web)
github.com (Package)
github.com/opencontainers/runc has other advisories on record. If you are patching this one, these are worth checking on the same host:
These advisories are the same class of weakness (CWE-61: UNIX Symbolic Link (Symlink) Following) in other software:
Details
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Affected Packages
| Software | From version | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/opencontainers/runc | — | — |
| runc | — | — |
References
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