Dalfox has an Unauthenticated Remote DoS via Closed-Channel Write in ParameterAnalysis (server mode)
ParameterAnalysis in pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go runs two sequential worker stages that both write to the same results channel. The channel is correctly closed after the first stage completes (close(results) at line 438), but the second stage — which processes POST-body parameters (dp) — is then launched with the same already-closed channel as its output. When a scanned parameter is reflected, processParams executes results <- paramResult on the closed channel, triggering a Go runtime panic that crashes the entire dalfox process. In server mode, the crash is remotely triggerable by any unauthenticated caller who can reach the REST API, because the default configuration has no API key and the second stage activates whenever options.Data != "" (i.e., the attacker supplies the data field) and the target reflects at least one parameter.
High (CVSS 3.1: 7.5)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
0.0.0.0:6664 by default; reachable by any network peer.data field that populates the second stage's work queue, and the target URL they point at a reflective server they control.--api-key defaults to "", so no auth middleware is registered.recover terminates the entire Go process; the impact stays within the dalfox process authority.Note on PR #917: Commit 8a424d1 (fix: resolve data race and nil pointer panic in processParams) fixed two concurrent-safety bugs in processParams — a data race on paramResult.Chars and a nil pointer dereference on resp.Header. It did not fix the closed-channel panic reported here, which is a structural ordering bug in ParameterAnalysis itself, not inside processParams.
pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go — ParameterAnalysis() (lines 436–448): results channel closed at line 438, then passed to second-stage processParams workers at line 445pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go — processParams() (line 299): results <- paramResult panics when results is closedParameterAnalysis allocates a single results channel shared by both worker stages:
```go
// pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go:397-408
paramsQue := make(chan string, concurrency)
results := make(chan model.ParamResult, concurrency) // ← single channel for both stages
go func() {
for result := range results { // consumer exits when results is closed
mutex.Lock()
params[result.Name] = result
mutex.Unlock()
}
}()
```
First stage (URL parameters in p):
```go
// lines 410-437
for i := 0; i < concurrency; i++ {
wgg.Add(1)
go func() {
processParams(target, paramsQue, results, options, rl, miningCheckerLine, pLog)
wgg.Done()
}()
}
// ... feed paramsQue ...
close(paramsQue)
wgg.Wait()
close(results) // ← line 438: results is now closed; consumer goroutine exits
```
Second stage (POST-body parameters in dp):
```go
// lines 440-448
var wggg sync.WaitGroup
paramsDataQue := make(chan string, concurrency)
for j := 0; j < concurrency; j++ {
wggg.Add(1)
go func() {
processParams(target, paramsDataQue, results, options, rl, miningCheckerLine, pLog)
// ^^^^^^^ — same closed channel
wggg.Done()
}()
}
```
When a second-stage worker finds a reflected parameter, processParams sends to the closed channel:
```go
// pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go:299
results <- paramResult // panic: send on closed channel
```
A Go runtime panic in a goroutine without a recover terminates the entire program. In server mode, this kills the dalfox API server process.
Condition 1 — dp is non-empty: dp (the POST-body parameter map) is populated in addParamsFromWordlist → setP whenever options.Data != "":
```go
// parameterAnalysis.go:41-45
if options.Data != "" {
if dp.Get(name) == "" {
dp.Set(name, "")
}
}
```
The attacker sets "data": "q=test" in the JSON body, which propagates through Initialize (lib/func.go:106). With "mining-dict": true, the entire GF-XSS wordlist (hundre
This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is low, an attacker needs no privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is unchanged, so the impact stays within the vulnerable component. Rated impact: confidentiality none, integrity none, availability high.
The score comes from this vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVE-2026-45090 is classified as CWE-362: Race Condition. Concurrent operations share state without proper synchronisation, so timing decides whether the result is correct.
CVE-2026-45090 is recorded against 3 packages.
Published on 12 May 2026 and last revised on 8 June 2026. No public exploit is currently recorded for this entry. Record sourced from NVD.
github.com (Web)
nvd.nist.gov (Advisory)
github.com (Package)
github.com (Web)
github.com/hahwul/dalfox has other advisories on record. If you are patching this one, these are worth checking on the same host:
These advisories are the same class of weakness (CWE-362: Race Condition) in other software:
Details
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Affected Packages
| Software | From version | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/hahwul/dalfox | — | — |
| github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2 | — | — |
| unknown | — | — |
References
Similar Threats
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