Cosmos-Server has an authentication bypass via forward-auth header smuggling on Constellation tunnel
The Constellation-tunnel bypass branch in tokenMiddleware at src/proxy/routerGen.go:53-66 returns to the upstream handler before the request's x-cosmos-user, x-cosmos-role, x-cosmos-user-role, and x-cosmos-mfa headers are stripped at lines 68-72, and before the AdminOnlyWithRedirect gate at lines 109-117 runs. Any holder of a valid Constellation device API key sends x-cosmos-user: admin to a proxied backend; the documented forward-auth integration treats the caller as admin with no JWT cookie, password, or MFA.
x-cstln-auth API key for an enrolled device.AuthEnabled=true; upstream trusts the x-cosmos-user forward-auth header.```go
// src/proxy/routerGen.go:46-122 - bypass returns before headers are reset
func tokenMiddleware(route utils.ProxyRouteConfig) func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
enabled := route.AuthEnabled
adminOnly := route.AdminOnly
// bypass auth if from Constellation tunnel
if ((enabled && r.Header.Get("x-cosmos-user") != "") || !enabled) { // attacker-set header opens the branch
remoteAddr, _ := utils.SplitIP(r.RemoteAddr)
isConstIP := constellation.IsConstellationIP(remoteAddr)
isConstTokenValid := constellation.CheckConstellationToken(r) == nil
if isConstIP && isConstTokenValid {
utils.Debug("Bypassing auth for Constellation tunnel")
r.Header.Del("x-cstln-auth")
next.ServeHTTP(w, r) // forwards x-cosmos-user as set by attacker
return
}
}
r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-user") // only runs on the fall-through path
r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-role")
r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-user-role")
r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-mfa")
r.Header.Del("x-cstln-auth")
// ... JWT path runs here ...
if enabled && adminOnly {
if errT := AdminOnlyWithRedirect(w, r, route); errT != nil { // also skipped by bypass
return
}
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
```
The branch was written for tunneled-cluster traffic where an upstream Cosmos instance has already authenticated the user and signed the x-cosmos-user header itself. The branch condition reads the header before the strip block runs at lines 68-72, so any client can open the branch by sending the header. The Constellation IP and API-key checks then gate progression, but a Constellation device holder satisfies both: the API key was issued by the admin when the device was enrolled, and the tunnel terminates with the device's Constellation IP as the TCP source. Once the branch is taken, the original x-cosmos-user value flows to the backend untouched, and AdminOnlyWithRedirect is never invoked. Backends configured per Cosmos's documented forward-auth integration (the standard pattern for "Cosmos in front of an app that reads identity from a header") treat the attacker's chosen string as the authenticated identity.
The Constellation network is sold as a way for an operator to invite family and friends without exposing ports. Those invited members hold device API keys but are not Cosmos administrators - the trust boundary this bug crosses is exactly the "invited member -> admin role on a proxied app" line.
Environment used to reproduce:
master branch, audited 2026-05-13 (module github.com/azukaar/cosmos-server)docker run azukaar/cosmos-server:latest (or the docker-compose.yml from the project README)1. Complete initial setup via /cosmos-ui/; promote the operator account to admin.
2. Enable Constellation: Settings > Constellation > Create lighthouse.
3. Enrol a device under a non-admin user: Constellation > Devices > Create. Save the device profile and the displayed API key.
4. Configure one proxy route with Host=admin-app.example, Mode=PROXY, Target=http://internal-app:port, AuthEnabled=true, AdminOnly=true. Upstream must trust the x-cosmos-user header (the documented Cosmos forward-auth integration, e.g. an internal admin panel that reads identity from that header).
5. Attacker connects to the Nebula tunnel with the issued device profile, so the request's TCP source is the device's Constellation IP.
```bash
# 1. Variables - fill in from the steps above
DEVICE_APIKEY="<APIKey shown when admin created th
This issue can be reached from an adjacent network, attack complexity is low, an attacker needs administrative privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is unchanged, so the impact stays within the vulnerable component. Rated impact: confidentiality high, integrity high, availability none.
The score comes from this vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
CVE-2026-49446 is classified as CWE-285: Improper Authorization. A request is carried out without confirming that the caller is permitted to perform it on that specific resource.
CVE-2026-49446 is recorded against 1 package.
Published on 18 August 2026. No public exploit is currently recorded for this entry. Record sourced from OSV.
github.com (Advisory)
github.com (Web)
github.com/azukaar/cosmos-server has other advisories on record. If you are patching this one, these are worth checking on the same host:
These advisories are the same class of weakness (CWE-285: Improper Authorization) in other software:
Details
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Affected Packages
| Software | From version | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/azukaar/cosmos-server | — | — |
References
Similar Threats
Free Vulnerability Check
BotEraser helps you identify potentially vulnerable plugins and themes by checking your installation against CVE-2026-49446 and other known CVE records.
Scan My Site Free →No credit card required · Results in minutes
ⓘ Data Notice: The information presented above has been compiled from publicly available internet sources. Boteraser aggregates this data solely for informational purposes and does not independently classify, evaluate, or endorse any findings about the vulnerabilities listed. The accuracy and completeness of this information is the sole responsibility of the original publishers. Boteraser and its operators accept no liability for any decisions made based on this data.
Stay up to date with the latest from Boteraser.
We use cookies to improve your experience on our site. By using our site, you consent to cookies.
Manage your cookie preferences below:
Essential cookies enable basic functions and are necessary for the proper function of the website.
CloudFlare provides web performance and security solutions, enhancing site speed and protecting against threats.
Service URL: developers.cloudflare.com (opens in a new window)
These cookies are needed for adding comments on this website.
These cookies are used for managing login functionality on this website.
Statistics cookies collect information anonymously. This information helps us understand how visitors use our website.
Google Analytics is a powerful tool that tracks and analyzes website traffic for informed marketing decisions.
Service URL: policies.google.com (opens in a new window)
You can find more information in our Cookie Policy and Privacy Policy.