🛡️ CVE-2026-54052 — n8n-mcp
Description
n8n-MCP: Cross-tenant access to workflow version backups in multi-tenant HTTP deployments
Impact
In multi-tenant HTTP deployments — where a single n8n-mcp server serves several tenants — the locally stored workflow version history (the automatic backups taken before workflow updates) was not isolated per tenant. An authenticated tenant could read workflow version snapshots belonging to other tenants, and could delete or destroy other tenants' stored backups.
A stored snapshot includes full node definitions, so the exposed data can contain credential references and authorization headers configured on nodes. This is therefore a confidentiality issue in addition to an integrity/availability one.
Affected configurations
- HTTP mode with multi-tenancy enabled (
ENABLE_MULTI_TENANT=true), where multiple tenants are served by a single shared instance and database.
Not affected:
- stdio / single-user deployments (e.g. Claude Desktop).
- Single-tenant HTTP deployments (one tenant per instance and database).
Affected versions
<= 2.56.0
Patched version
2.56.1. The stored version history is now isolated per instance, so a tenant can only access its own backups. Upgrading runs a one-time migration that isolates existing history and clears previously stored, un-scoped backups (these are auto-created, short-retention backups).
Workarounds
If users cannot upgrade immediately:
- Disable the workflow version tool by setting
DISABLED_TOOLS=n8n_workflow_versionsin the server environment (for example, in your Docker.env). This removes the affected tool from the deployment for all tenants; automatic backups are unaffected, but the cross-tenant access path is closed. - Alternatively, do not run in multi-tenant mode — serve each tenant from a separate instance with its own database, so no local store is shared between tenants.
- Restrict network access to the HTTP endpoint to trusted operators.
stdio and single-tenant HTTP deployments are not affected.
Credit
Reported by Francisco Rosales (@0xmagic0) and coordinated by Ax Sharma (@axsharma) of Manifold Security.
How this vulnerability can be exploited
This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is low, an attacker needs low-level privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is changed, meaning a successful attack can affect components beyond the vulnerable one. Rated impact: confidentiality high, integrity high, availability low.
Weakness class
CVE-2026-54052 is classified as CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key. An object is selected by an identifier from the request without checking the caller owns it.
Affected software
CVE-2026-54052 is recorded against 1 package.
- n8n-mcp
Timeline and source
Published on 14 July 2026 and last revised on 18 July 2026. No public exploit is currently recorded for this entry. Record sourced from OSV.
References
Details
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L
Affected Packages
| Software | From version | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| n8n-mcp | — | — |
References
Similar Threats
- Medium CVE-2026-55608
- Medium CVE-2026-45582
- High CVE-2026-45707
- High CVE-2026-44694
- High GHSA-8g7g-hmwm-6rv2
More CVE 2026 advisories
Browse all of CVE 2026 in the advisory index.
Exploit Protection
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