Grav is Vulnerable to XXE via SVG Upload
Dear Grav Security Team,
A security vulnerability was discovered in Grav CMS that allows authenticated attackers to read arbitrary files from the server through XML External Entity (XXE) injection.
Vulnerability Summary
| Field | Details |
|-------|---------|
| Vulnerability Type | XML External Entity (XXE) Injection |
| Severity | High (CVSS 7.5) |
| Affected Versions | Grav CMS <= 1.7.x |
| Affected Component | SVG file upload/processing |
| CWE | CWE-611: Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference |
| Authentication Required | Yes (Admin panel access) |
Technical Details
Root Cause
The application uses simplexml_load_string() to process uploaded SVG files without disabling external entity loading. This allows attackers to inject XXE payloads that are processed by the XML parser.
Vulnerable Code Pattern
```php
// Current (Vulnerable):
$svg = simplexml_load_string($content);
// No LIBXML_NOENT flag or entity loader protection
```
Attack Vector
1. Attacker authenticates to Grav admin panel
2. Uploads malicious SVG file via Pages → Media or File Manager plugin
3. Server parses SVG and processes XXE entities
4. Arbitrary file contents are exfiltrated
Impact
An authenticated attacker can:
1. Read sensitive files:
/etc/passwd - System user informationuser/accounts/*.yaml - Admin credentials and 2FA secretsuser/config/system.yaml - System configuration.env files - Environment secrets and API keys
2. Perform SSRF - Access internal services via external entity URLs
3. Potential DoS - Billion laughs attack via recursive entity expansion
Proof of Concept
Malicious SVG Payload
```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE svg [
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="100" height="100">
<text x="10" y="50">&xxe;</text>
</svg>
```
Steps to Reproduce
1. Login to Grav CMS admin panel
2. Navigate to Pages → select any page → Media tab
3. Upload the malicious SVG file
4. Observe file contents in response/error or stored output
Recommended Fix
Option 1: Add XXE Protection Flags
```php
libxml_use_internal_errors(true);
$svg = simplexml_load_string($content, 'SimpleXMLElement', LIBXML_NOENT | LIBXML_DTDLOAD);
```
Option 2: Use SVG Sanitizer Library (Recommended)
```php
use enshrined\svgSanitize\Sanitizer;
$sanitizer = new Sanitizer();
$sanitizer->removeRemoteReferences(true);
$cleanSVG = $sanitizer->sanitize($content);
```
The enshrined/svg-sanitize library properly strips XXE payloads and other malicious SVG content.
Request
1. Please acknowledge receipt of this report within 5 business days
2. Please provide an estimated timeline for a security patch
3. I am happy to assist with testing the fix
4. I request a CVE be assigned for this vulnerability
5. If you have a security advisory process, please include me in the credits
Turki Almatrafi.
Maintainer note — fix applied (2026-04-24)
Fixed across two repos:
1. Grav core on the 2.0 branch (commit [5a12f9be8](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/5a12f9be8), ships in 2.0.0-beta.2) — VectorImageMedium::__construct (the code path that reads width/height from an uploaded SVG) now strips <!DOCTYPE> and <!ENTITY> declarations before parsing, and calls simplexml_load_string with LIBXML_NONET | LIBXML_NOERROR | LIBXML_NOWARNING. On PHP < 8 it also calls libxml_disable_entity_loader(true) for the duration of the parse.
2. rhukster/dom-sanitizer (commit [02d08ec](https://github.com/rhukster/dom-sanitizer/commit/02d08ec)) — the library Grav ships as its SVG sanitizer. loadDocument now applies the same DOCTYPE/ENTITY strip and passes LIBXML_NONET to loadXML/loadHTML.
With both layers in place, the PoC:
```xml
<!DOCTYPE svg [
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="100" height="100">
<text x="10" y="50">&xxe;</text>
</svg>
```
no longer expands &xxe;, and the parser cannot make outbound filesystem or network requests for external entities/DTDs. Billion-laughs-style entity expansion is also neutralized because the declarations are stripped before libxml ever sees them.
Files:
- [
system/src/Grav/Common/Page/Medium/VectorImageMedium.php](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/system/src/Grav/Common/Page/Medium/VectorImageMedium.php). - [
tests/unit/Grav/Common/Security/SvgXxeSecurityTest.php](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/blob/2.0/tests/unit/Grav/Common/Security/SvgXxeSecurityTest.php) — XXE neutralization + billion-laughs + plain-SVG regression. - dom-sanitizer: [
src/DOMSanitizer.php](https://github.com/rhukster/dom-sanitizer/blob/main/src/DOMSanitizer.php) + two new XXE tests in its own suite.
