Axios: Prototype pollution gadgets can alter axios request construction
axios is vulnerable to read-side prototype-pollution gadgets when Object.prototype has already been polluted by another vulnerability or dependency. The most broadly reachable issue is in the bodyless method aliases: axios.get(), axios.delete(), axios.head(), and axios.options() read inherited data before config normalization, causing attacker-controlled body data to be sent on requests that did not explicitly set a body.
Additional low-level paths affect consumers that call exported adapters/helpers directly with plain config objects. In those cases, inherited proxy or paramsSerializer values can influence request routing or URL serialization. These low-level paths are not reproduced through normal axios.get() usage on 1.15.2+.
An attacker who can first pollute Object.prototype can cause axios to send attacker-controlled request bodies on bodyless method aliases. This can corrupt request semantics where the receiving service processes bodies on GET, DELETE, HEAD, or OPTIONS.
For direct low-level Node HTTP adapter usage, inherited proxy can route requests through an attacker-controlled proxy. Depending on axios version, target scheme, and proxy behavior, this can expose request URLs, headers, and bodies or allow traffic modification.
For direct resolveConfig or browser-adapter helper usage, inherited paramsSerializer can be invoked with request params, allowing attacker-controlled URL serialization. This was not reproduced through normal high-level axios calls on 1.15.2+.
Affected normal API:
axios.get(url[, config])axios.delete(url[, config])axios.head(url[, config])axios.options(url[, config])Affected low-level usage:
axios/lib/adapters/http.js or axios/unsafe/adapters/http.js with plain configs and no own proxy.axios/unsafe/helpers/resolveConfig.js or direct browser adapter/helper paths with plain configs and no own paramsSerializer.Unaffected or corrected scope:
axios.get() calls on 1.15.2+ did not reproduce the proxy or paramsSerializer gadgets because mergeConfig() returns a null-prototype config and uses own-property reads.lib/core/Axios.js constructs aliases for bodyless methods and copies data with (config || {}).data before config normalization. If Object.prototype.data is polluted, this inherited value becomes an own data property in the merged request config and is sent by the adapter.
lib/core/mergeConfig.js in 1.15.2+ returns a null-prototype config and uses hasOwnProp guards, which prevents normal high-level requests from inheriting polluted proxy and paramsSerializer values after merge. This is why those two reporter claims do not reproduce through normal axios.get() on 1.15.2 or 1.16.1.
The low-level adapter/helper paths can still receive plain configs directly. In that usage, direct reads of config.proxy in the Node HTTP adapter and config.paramsSerializer in affected resolveConfig() versions can consume inherited polluted values.
```js
import http from 'http';
import axios from 'axios';
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
let body = '';
req.on('data', chunk => {
body += chunk;
});
req.on('end', () => {
res.writeHead(200, {'content-type': 'application/json'});
res.end(JSON.stringify({body, headers: req.headers}));
});
});
await new Promise(resolve => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve));
Object.prototype.data = 'INJECTED';
try {
const res = await axios.get(http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}/data);
console.log(res.data.body); // "INJECTED"
console.log(res.data.headers['content-length']); // "8"
} finally {
delete Object.prototype.data;
await new Promise(resolve => server.close(resolve));
}
```
Expected result: a request body is sent even though the caller did not explicitly set config.data.
Avoid processing untrusted input with libraries or code paths that can pollute Object.prototype. As a defense-in-depth mitigation before an axios fix is available, explicitly pass data: undefined on bodyless method aliases when running in a process where prototype pollution is a concern.
<details>
<summary>Original Report</summary>
Three prototype pollution read-side gadgets in axios bypass the own() hasOwnProp guard pattern, allowing a polluted Object.prototype to hijack outbound requests.
The [own() helper](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.15.2/lib/adapters/http.js#L342) was introduced after GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj to prevent polluted prototype properties from reaching security-sensitive config reads. Three paths were missed:
config.proxy at [http.js:715](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.15.2/lib/adapters/http.js#L715) goes strai
This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is high, an attacker needs no privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. Rated impact: confidentiality none, integrity low, availability none.
The score comes from this vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CVE-2026-67316 is classified as CWE-1321: Prototype Pollution. Attacker input can modify an object prototype, changing behaviour for objects across the application.
CVE-2026-67316 is recorded against 2 packages.
Published on 20 July 2026 and last revised on 2 August 2026. No public exploit is currently recorded for this entry. Record sourced from NVD.
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Package)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Web)
axios has other advisories on record. If you are patching this one, these are worth checking on the same host:
These advisories are the same class of weakness (CWE-1321: Prototype Pollution) in other software:
Details
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Affected Packages
| Software | From version | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| axios | — | — |
| unknown | — | — |
References
Similar Threats
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