Eclipse Jetty: Path parameter traversal
In Jetty 12.1.8, org.eclipse.jetty.util.URIUtil.canonicalPath() may leave dot-dot path segments unnormalized when a semicolon path parameter marker is followed by a slash and a dot
segment.
A minimal example is:
/public;/../admin/secret
In my local reproduction, URIUtil.canonicalPath() returns:
/public/../admin/secret
instead of the expected normalized path:
/admin/secret
When Jetty's SecurityHandler.PathMapped is used to protect a path prefix such as /admin/*, the non-normalized canonical path may not match the protected prefix. As a result, an unauthenticated request may bypass the configured path-based security constraint.
Jetty: 12.1.8
JDK: 17.0.18
Maven: 3.9.14
Maven artifacts used:
org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server:12.1.8
org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-security:12.1.8
org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-session:12.1.8
Only confirmed Jetty 12.1.8 so far.
Starts a minimal Jetty server with the following security setup:
```java
SecurityHandler.PathMapped security = new SecurityHandler.PathMapped();
security.put("/admin/*", Constraint.from("admin"));
security.put("/*", Constraint.ALLOWED);
security.setAuthenticator(new BasicAuthenticator());
```
The test then sends requests with no Authorization header.
Observed result:
```
GET /admin/secret -> 401
GET /public;x/../admin/secret -> 200
```
The handler receives paths such as:
/public/../admin/secret
This suggests that the /admin/* security constraint is bypassed because PathMapped matching is performed against the non-normalized canonical path.
The suspected root cause is in URIUtil.canonicalPath().
The relevant logic is approximately:
```java
for (int i = 0; i < end; i++)
{
char c = encodedPath.charAt(i);
switch (c)
{
case ';':
if (builder == null)
{
builder = new Utf8StringBuilder(encodedPath.length());
builder.append(encodedPath, 0, i);
}
while (++i < end)
{
if (encodedPath.charAt(i) == '/')
{
builder.append('/');
break;
}
}
break;
case '.':
if (slash)
normal = false;
if (builder != null)
builder.append(c);
break;
}
slash = c == '/';
}
String canonical = (builder != null)
? (onBadUtf8 == null ? builder.toCompleteString() : builder.takeCompleteString(onBadUtf8))
: encodedPath;
return normal ? canonical : normalizePath(canonical);
```
For the input:
/public;/../admin/secret
when the outer loop reaches the semicolon:
```
i = 7
c = ';'
slash = false
normal = true
```
Inside case ';', the while (++i < end) loop advances i to the next character, which is already '/' for the empty path parameter form ";/".
The code then appends '/' to the canonical builder:
builder.append('/');
At this point, the canonical builder ends with '/':
/public/
However, the local variable c is still the old value ';', because c was read before entering the switch and is not updated when the inner loop advances i.
After leaving the switch, the loop updates the slash state using:
slash = c == '/';
Since c is still ';', slash becomes false.
On the next iteration, the scanner reaches '.', which is the first dot in the following "../" segment. Because slash is incorrectly false, this code does not run:
```java
if (slash)
normal = false;
```
Therefore normal remains true, and canonicalPath() returns the canonical string directly instead of calling normalizePath(canonical).
The result is:
/public/../admin/secret
instead of:
/admin/secret
In short:
case ';' advances the scan position i and appends '/' to the canonical builder, but the loop tail still updates slash from the stale character c=';'. As a result, the following dot-dot segment is not detected as a path traversal segment.
The issue is not limited to a non-empty path parameter such as ";x".
The more precise trigger shape is:
;[^/]*/.
Examples:
```
/public;/../admin/secret
/public;x/../admin/secret
/public;anything/../admin/secret
/public;/./admin/secret
```
The minimal form is:
/public;/../admin/secret
because the semicolon is immediately followed by '/', so the inner while loop reaches '/' on its first increment.
A minimal fix would be to ensure that, when case ';' consumes input until '/' and appends '/' to the canonical builder, the slash state reflects the last effective cha
This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is low, an attacker needs no privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is unchanged, so the impact stays within the vulnerable component. Rated impact: confidentiality none, integrity low, availability none.
The score comes from this vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
CVE-2026-8384 is classified as CWE-647: Use of Non-Canonical URL Paths for Authorization Decisions. The product defines policy namespaces and makes authorization decisions based on the assumption that a URL is canonical. This can allow a non-canonical URL to bypass the authorization.
CVE-2026-8384 is recorded against 2 packages.
Published on 14 July 2026. A public exploit is known to exist, which raises the urgency of patching considerably. Record sourced from NVD.
jetty has other advisories on record. If you are patching this one, these are worth checking on the same host:
These advisories are the same class of weakness (CWE-647: Use of Non-Canonical URL Paths for Authorization Decisions) in other software:
Details
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Affected Packages
| Software | From version | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| jetty | 12.1.0 | 12.1.9 |
| org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-util | 12.1.0 | 12.1.9 |
References
Similar Threats
Exploit Protection
CVE-2026-8384 carries CVSS 5.3 Medium rating and a public exploit already exists. BotEraser checks your installation against this and other known CVE records, and blocks IPs associated with exploit activity.
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