🛡️ CVE-2026-57124 — praisonai
Description
PraisonAI: Missing Authentication for Critical Function and Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') in praisonai
# Unauthenticated PraisonAI UI MCP connect endpoint executes attacker-chosen local commands
Summary
PraisonAI v4.6.48 exposes the PraisonAIUI MCP client management API through the default UI host apps without authentication. A remote unauthenticated client can send POST /api/mcp/connect with a command and args field. The endpoint passes those values into the MCP stdio client, which starts the attacker-selected local process as the PraisonAI UI service user.
The issue is reachable through PraisonAI's hosted UI integration (praisonai ui, praisonai ui agents, praisonai claw, and any app using praisonai.integration.host_app.create_host_app() / build_host_app()). praisonai ui and related Typer UI commands bind to 0.0.0.0 by default.
Affected Versions
Confirmed affected:
praisonaiv4.6.48- Commit tested:
d5f1114aaf1a2e9f121a6e66b929149ca2201f1d - Tag tested:
v4.6.48 - Pinned UI dependency:
aiui==0.3.121fromsrc/praisonai/uv.lock
Likely affected:
- Any PraisonAI release that exposes
aiui/praisonaiuicreate_app()through the PraisonAI UI host apps without authentication and includes themcpdependency. I only confirmed the latest release during this audit.
Severity
Reasoning:
AV: the vulnerable endpoint is an HTTP API route.AC: a single POST request is sufficient.PR: default UI host apps do not require credentials unless opt-in auth is configured.UI: no victim interaction is needed after the server is running.S: code executes in the PraisonAI UI server process context.C/I/A: arbitrary local command execution permits secret exfiltration, file tampering, and service disruption.
Root Cause
PraisonAI depends on MCP by default and exposes PraisonAIUI via optional UI extras:
src/praisonai/pyproject.toml:11includes base dependencies.src/praisonai/pyproject.toml:19includesmcp>=1.20.0.src/praisonai/pyproject.toml:25defines theuiextra withaiui>=0.3.121,<0.4.src/praisonai/pyproject.toml:197defines theclawextra withaiui[all]>=0.3.121,<0.4.
PraisonAI's UI commands bind externally by default and launch aiui run:
src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/ui.py:114setshost="0.0.0.0"forpraisonai ui.src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/ui.py:163passes that host toaiui run.src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/ui.py:186,:204, and:222also default subcommands to0.0.0.0.src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/claw.py:41defines the full dashboard command.src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/claw.py:93launchesaiui runwith the selected host.
PraisonAI's default apps create the PraisonAIUI Starlette app without forcing authentication:
src/praisonai/praisonai/ui_chat/default_app.py:18callsconfigure_host(...).src/praisonai/praisonai/ui_chat/default_app.py:142exportsapp = create_host_app().src/praisonai/praisonai/claw/default_app.py:63callsconfigure_host(...).src/praisonai/praisonai/claw/default_app.py:128exportsapp = create_host_app().src/praisonai/praisonai/integration/host_app.py:174importspraisonaiui.server.create_app.src/praisonai/praisonai/integration/host_app.py:180returnscreate_app().
In aiui==0.3.121, the exposed server registers the MCP routes and auth is opt-in:
praisonaiui/server.py:1483definesapi_mcp_connect.praisonaiui/server.py:1488reads attacker-controlled JSON.praisonaiui/server.py:1491accepts eithercommandorurl.praisonaiui/server.py:1496callsconnect_mcp_server(body).praisonaiui/server.py:2516definescreate_app(..., require_auth=False, ...).praisonaiui/server.py:2550addsAuthEnforcementMiddleware, but it only enforces auth whenAUTH_ENFORCE=true.praisonaiui/server.py:2769registers/api/mcp/servers.praisonaiui/server.py:2770registers/api/mcp/connect.
The MCP feature converts the request body into a local process launch:
praisonaiui/features/mcp.py:325definesconnect_server(self, server_config).praisonaiui/features/mcp.py:330chooses stdio transport whencommandis present.praisonaiui/features/mcp.py:332constructsStdioMCPClient(command=server_config["command"], args=server_config.get("args", [])).praisonaiui/features/mcp.py:360callsclient.connect(), which invokes the MCP stdio transport and starts the process.
Minimal PoC
PoC file: poc/praisonai-aiui-mcp-connect-rce.py
The PoC runs the PraisonAI host app in-process, sends the unauthenticated HTTP request, and asks the server to execute /usr/bin/touch /tmp/praisonai_host_app_mcp_touch_marker.txt. It does not contact an LLM provider and uses no credentials.
Observed output from the tested checkout with aiui==0.3.121 and mcp==1.25.0 available:
```text
[19:19:55
How this vulnerability can be exploited
This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is low, an attacker needs no privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is unchanged, so the impact stays within the vulnerable component. Rated impact: confidentiality high, integrity high, availability high.
Weakness class
CVE-2026-57124 is classified as CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function. A sensitive function can be reached without authenticating at all.
Affected software
CVE-2026-57124 is recorded against 1 package.
- praisonai (fixed in 4.6.59)
Timeline and source
Published on 18 June 2026 and last revised on 23 July 2026. No public exploit is currently recorded for this entry. Record sourced from OSV.
References
Details
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected Packages
| Software | From version | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| praisonai | — | 4.6.59 |
References
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