PraisonAI LinearBot processes unsigned webhooks when LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET is missing
# PraisonAI LinearBot processes unsigned webhooks when LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET is missing
Summary
PraisonAI's LinearBot starts a public webhook listener on 0.0.0.0 and treats
LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET as optional. When the secret is absent, startup only logs
a warning and _handle_webhook() skips Linear-Signature verification entirely.
An unauthenticated network caller who can reach the webhook endpoint can submit
a forged Linear-Event: AgentSession request. The forged request is parsed,
scheduled for background processing, dispatched to _handle_agent_session(),
and passed into BotSessionManager.chat(). The bot then attempts to post the
agent response back to Linear under the configured bot token.
The local PoV is offline and deterministic. It does not contact Linear. It calls
the webhook handler directly, monkey-patches the outbound Linear comment path,
and proves both sides of the boundary:
- no secret configured: unsigned forged webhook returns
200, invokes the
agent session path once, and attempts one Linear comment;
- secret configured: missing and bad signatures both return
401 and do not
invoke the agent;
- secret configured with valid HMAC: request returns
200 and invokes the
agent, proving the control path still works.
Affected Product
- Repository:
MervinPraison/PraisonAI - Package:
praisonai - Components:
src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/linear.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/bots_cli.py
Validated affected:
- live
main / latest observed release v4.6.58:
1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e
- previous local current checkout:
2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1
Sampled tags where the LinearBot component was not present:
v4.5.49v4.5.51v4.6.9v4.6.10
Suggested affected range: LinearBot-bearing releases with the fail-open
signature behavior, at least 4.5.50 and >= 4.6.56, <= 4.6.58. The
component appears non-contiguously in sampled tags, so maintainers should
confirm the exact packaged version history before publishing a final range.
Root Cause
LinearBot.__init__() accepts an empty signing secret and falls back to an
empty environment value:
```python
self._signing_secret = signing_secret or os.environ.get("LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET", "")
```
start() treats the missing secret as a warning instead of refusing to expose
the webhook listener:
```python
if not self._signing_secret:
logger.warning("LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET not set - webhook signatures will not be verified")
self._site = web.TCPSite(self._runner, "0.0.0.0", self._webhook_port)
```
_handle_webhook() only verifies the request if the secret is truthy:
```python
if self._signing_secret:
signature = request.headers.get("Linear-Signature", "")
if not self._verify_signature(raw_body, signature):
return web.Response(status=401, text="Invalid signature")
```
With no secret configured, the code continues to JSON parsing, accepts a caller
supplied webhookTimestamp, reads the caller supplied Linear-Event header,
and schedules processing:
```python
event_type = request.headers.get("Linear-Event", "")
task = asyncio.create_task(self._process_webhook(event_type, body))
return web.Response(status=200, text="OK")
```
For AgentSession, the forged body is routed to the agent:
```python
if event_type == "AgentSession":
await self._handle_agent_session(body)
...
response = await self._session_mgr.chat(self._agent, user_id, message.content)
await self._send_comment(...)
```
The CLI has the same fail-open posture: start_linear() loads
LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET, prints a warning when it is missing, then reports a
public http://0.0.0.0:<port>/webhook endpoint with verification disabled.
Why This Is Not Intended Behavior
PraisonAI's Linear Bot documentation tells operators to set
LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET, pass it to praisonai bot linear, copy the Linear
webhook signing secret, and use it for HMAC-SHA256 verification. The same page
says missing secrets disable signature verification, while its best-practices
section says webhook secrets ensure authenticity.
Linear's webhook documentation says receivers should ensure requests were sent
by Linear by verifying the Linear-Signature HMAC over the raw body, then
checking that webhookTimestamp is recent. The timestamp check alone is not an
authentication boundary because an attacker can supply a current timestamp in a
forged body.
The implementation itself also confirms the intended boundary: when a secret is
configured, missing and bad signatures are rejected before agent dispatch. The
bug is the missing-secret fail-open mode on a public webhook server, not the
signature algorithm.
Local PoV
Run against the latest observed release checkout:
```bash
python3 submission-bundle/praisonai-prai-cand-013-linear-webhook-signature-fail-open/poc/po
