PraisonAI DiscordApproval accepts unrelated channel messages as dangerous-tool approvals
# DiscordApproval accepts unrelated channel messages as dangerous-tool approvals
Summary
praisonai.bots.DiscordApproval approves a pending dangerous tool call when it
sees any later non-bot message in the configured Discord channel whose text is
classified as approval, such as yes.
The decision is not bound to:
- a Discord reply to the approval message;
- a Discord thread created for that request;
- a Discord interaction/button callback for that request;
- an explicit approver user allowlist; or
- an approval nonce visible only to intended approvers.
As a result, any user who can post in the configured approval channel can
approve a pending high-risk tool call by sending yes after the approval
message appears. The same local PoV also shows that the Slack and Telegram
messaging approval backends have no explicit approver allowlist parameter, but
the primary report-grade issue is the Discord backend's unthreaded channel
cross-talk: the approving message does not need to be a reply or otherwise
request-bound.
Affected Product
- Repository:
MervinPraison/PraisonAI - Ecosystem:
pip - Package:
praisonai - Component: Python messaging approval backends
- Primary affected file:
src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/_discord_approval.py - Related sibling files:
src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/_slack_approval.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/bots/_telegram_approval.py- Latest PyPI version validated:
4.6.58 - Current
origin/main validated:
1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e
- Current
origin/main tag validated: v4.6.58
Suggested affected range:
```text
pip:praisonai >= 4.5.2, <= 4.6.58
```
Representative local sweep:
```text
4.5.0 Discord approval backend not present
4.5.2 vulnerable
4.5.128 vulnerable
4.6.9 vulnerable
4.6.10 vulnerable
4.6.56 vulnerable
4.6.57 vulnerable
4.6.58 vulnerable
```
Root Cause
DiscordApproval.request_approval() posts an approval message to the configured
channel and records the returned message id.
_poll_for_response() then polls channel history with:
```python
f"/channels/{channel_id}/messages?after={message_id}&limit=10"
```
For each later non-bot message, it reads content, classifies the text, and
returns ApprovalDecision(approved=True) when the text is approve/yes.
There is no check that the message is a Discord reply to the approval message,
belongs to a request-specific thread, came from an intended approver, or
contains a request-specific approval token.
Important source evidence from origin/main:
_discord_approval.py lines 57-73: constructor accepts token,
channel_id, timeout, and poll_interval; no approver allowlist.
_discord_approval.py line 239: polls all messages after the approval
message in the configured channel.
_discord_approval.py lines 252-265: skips bot messages, classifies the
remaining text, and approves when the keyword is approve.
The Slack and Telegram backends are better request-scoped than Discord:
- Slack uses
conversations.replies for the approval message thread. - Telegram checks the callback/reply message id.
However, both still lack an explicit approver identity parameter. They are
included in the PoV and suggested fix because the authorization model should be
consistent across all messaging approval backends.
Local PoV
Run against the latest local checkout:
```bash
python3 poc/pov_prai_cand_029_messaging_approval_channel_member_bypass.py \
--repo ../../artifacts/repos/praisonai-v4.6.58 \
--json
```
The PoV is local-only. It mocks Slack, Telegram, and Discord API helpers
in-process and does not contact those services.
For Discord, the mock sequence is:
1. DiscordApproval posts a critical execute_command approval request to
D_APPROVAL_CHANNEL.
2. The mocked channel-history endpoint returns a later ordinary non-bot
channel message from D_INTRUDER with content yes.
3. DiscordApproval returns approved=True and approver="D_INTRUDER".
Observed output from evidence/pov-v4.6.58.json:
```json
{
"approval_from_unconfigured_channel_participant": {
"discord": true,
"slack": true,
"telegram": true
},
"backends": [
{
"backend": "discord",
"configured_channel_id": "D_APPROVAL_CHANNEL",
"decision_approved": true,
"decision_approver": "D_INTRUDER",
"decision_reason": "Approved via Discord by intruder",
"intruder_user": "D_INTRUDER"
}
],
"no_explicit_approver_allowlist_parameters": true,
"vulnerable": true
}
```
The command in the approval request is a harmless local sentinel:
touch /tmp/prai-cand-029. The PoV stops at the approval decision; it does not
execute the tool.
Why This Is Not Intended Behavior
This report does not claim that a deliberately private approval channel with
only trusted approvers is unsafe by itself. The narrower issue is that the
Discord
