PraisonAI Vulnerable to Argument Injection into Cloud Run Environment Variables via Unsanitized Comma in gcloud --set-env-vars
Summary
deploy.py constructs a single comma-delimited string for the gcloud run
deploy --set-env-vars argument by directly interpolating openai_model,
openai_key, and openai_base without validating that these values do not
contain commas. gcloud uses a comma as the key-value pair separator for
--set-env-vars. A comma in any of the three values causes gcloud to
parse the trailing text as additional KEY=VALUE definitions, injecting
arbitrary environment variables into the deployed Cloud Run service.
Grep Commands and Evidence
Step 1. Confirm the vulnerable string construction at line 150
```
grep -n "set-env-vars\|openai_key\|openai_base\|openai_model" \
src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy.py
```
Expected output showing unsanitized interpolation:
150: '--set-env-vars', f'OPENAI_MODEL_NAME={openai_model},OPENAI_API_KEY={openai_key},OPENAI_API_BASE={openai_base}'
Step 2. Confirm no comma validation exists before this line
```
grep -n "comma\|assertNotIn\|ValueError\|sanitize\|strip\|replace" \
src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy.py
```
Expected output: no results related to input validation
Step 3. View the full context of the vulnerable construction
```
sed -n '140,165p' \
src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy.py
```
This block shows the gcloud command list where the three values are
joined into one comma-separated string passed as a single argument
element. gcloud receives this string and applies its own
comma-based parsing, which the subprocess list form cannot prevent.
Step 4. Confirm subprocess is called without shell=True
```
grep -n "subprocess\|Popen\|shell=" \
src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy.py
```
This confirms shell=False (default), meaning the injection is at the
gcloud argument level, not the shell level. The comma delimiter is
parsed by gcloud itself, not by /bin/sh.
Step 5. Confirm no existing advisory covers this file
```
grep -rn "deploy.py\|set.env.vars\|openai_base" \
src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy.py
```
Vulnerability Description
File:
src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy.py
Vulnerable line:
```
150: '--set-env-vars', f'OPENAI_MODEL_NAME={openai_model},OPENAI_API_KEY={openai_key},OPENAI_API_BASE={openai_base}'
```
The three values openai_model, openai_key, and openai_base originate
from environment variables or user-provided configuration and are
interpolated directly into a single f-string without validation.
The subprocess call uses a Python list without shell=True. This means
there is no shell injection. The subprocess module passes the f-string
as one complete argument to gcloud. gcloud then applies its own internal
parsing to the value of --set-env-vars using a comma as the delimiter.
This parsing is entirely outside Python's control.
If any of the three values contains a comma, gcloud splits on that comma
and creates an additional KEY=VALUE environment variable from the text
following it. There is no error or warning from gcloud when this occurs.
The three values are attacker-controllable in any scenario where
environment variables can be set before the deploy command runs. This
includes compromised dotenv files, poisoned CI pipeline secrets, and
local developer machines where an attacker has shell access.
Proof of Concept
```
attacker-controlled openai_base value:
export OPENAI_API_KEY="sk-legitimate-key"
export OPENAI_MODEL_NAME="gpt-4"
export OPENAI_API_BASE="https://api.openai.com/v1,INJECTED=attacker_value"
```
Run the deploy command. The string constructed at line 150 becomes:
```
OPENAI_MODEL_NAME=gpt-4,OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-legitimate-key,OPENAI_API_BASE=https://api.openai.com/v1,INJECTED=attacker_value
```
gcloud parses this as four key-value pairs and creates all four as
environment variables in the Cloud Run service. INJECTED=attacker_value
is a real environment variable available to every request the service
handles.
Verify the injection after deployment:
```
gcloud run services describe praisonai-service \
--region us-central1 \
--format "value(spec.template.spec.containers[0].env)"
```
The output includes INJECTED alongside the three legitimate variables.
API key override:
export OPENAI_API_KEY="sk-real,OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-attacker"
The constructed string contains OPENAI_API_KEY twice. In gcloud versions
where the last-defined value takes precedence, the deployed service uses
sk-attacker for all LLM API calls. All agent traffic routes through the
attacker-controlled API account.
Impact
An attacker who can influence any of the three environment variables
before deploy.py runs can inject arbitrary environment variables into
the deployed Cloud Run production service without triggering any error.
Injection scenarios include a malicious git hook that modifies a dotenv
file before deployment, a compromised CI pipelin
